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Statist Means to Individualist Ends: 
Subjectivity, Automobility, and the 
Cold-War State 
Cotten Setter 
Autonomous individuals are artefacts, made possible by the 
power of the modern state. 
John Gray1 
It seems at first sight as if all the minds of the Americans were 
formed upon one model, so accurately do they follow the same 
route. 
Alexis de Tocqueville2 
The Cold-War Crisis of the Individual 
The primary antagonists of the Cold War never engaged in direct military 
combat; instead, they engaged one another on the numerous fronts of culture. 
Thomas Haskell and Richard Teichgraber note that the world-historical conflict 
between capitalism and socialism that crystallized into the Cold War has been 
in essence an ontological debate over "certain key questions concerning the 
status of the self and the authenticity of its experience of autonomy."3 Not 
surprisingly, the first decade of the Cold War witnessed a widespread and 
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manifold defense of "the individual" both at home and abroad. Policy architects 
of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations lamented the enervation of the 
individualistic "American character."4 Domestic prosperity and global hegemony, 
these elites feared, had undermined the nation's singular virtues, particularly 
those rooted in Calvinist Protestantism and the Jeffersonian yeoman ideal.5 The 
strategists of the Cold-War state were not alone in their misgivings; rather, the 
populist suspicion that the "autonomous self, long a linchpin of liberal culture, 
was being rendered unreal" emerged as a prominent postwar anxiety, informing 
and setting the parameters for a great deal of scholarly discourse, cultural 
production, and material culture.6 
In other words, during the 1950s, the Cold War "began to be waged about 
everything."7 The specter of totalitarianism haunted a great many American social 
scientists, historians, economists, theologians, artists, and cultural critics; it hung 
over a public sphere in which "expressions of support for liberal individualism 
. . . were frequent and endless."8 The most salient postwar scholarly studies of 
American society, such as David Riesman's The Lonely Crowd (1950), William 
Whyte's The Organization Man (1956), and C. Wright Mills' White Collar 
(1951), testified to the threat to individual autonomy posed by the "culture of 
abundance." These works focused on white middle-class men in their prime 
earning years (with the exception of Betty Friedan's 1963 The Feminine 
Mystique, which plumbed the inner desolation endured by their wives), an 
ostensibly representative group for which "the most compelling dilemma [was] 
the waning of independent individualism as a life-style and as a social value, 
and the disappearance of social types and groups that made individualism a 
living reality."9 These studies reflected what William Graebner has described as 
the "new fear (or, rather, anxiety, in a common distinction of the time). . . that 
modern Americans—as well as Germans and Russians—had somehow fashioned 
for themselves a straitjacket of institutions and values that contained and thwarted 
the most basic desires for freedom of action and freedom of will." Many postwar 
visual artists, filmmakers, writers, and musicians, too, took up the task of 
extricating themselves and their audiences from this straitjacket.10 
This widespread preoccupation with the decline of individualism indicated 
a shift by many intellectuals from prewar collectivistic movements for social 
justice to a focus on the pathologies afflicting the liberal-capitalist atom, the 
autonomous individual.11 While scholars' anxious eulogies for the latter and 
their lambasting of conformist culture did more than merely parrot Cold Warriors' 
contempt for American infantility and drift, they did appear to share the political 
elites' disdain for what William Whyte, in The Organization Man, called the 
"social ethic."12 The abject "lost individuals" who wandered the landscape of 
postwar social science bore an uncomfortable resemblance to the homo politicus 
that populated the Communist dystopia, a figure denied "all title to individuality," 
for whom "abnegation of self [is] the core of his morality and the first article of 
his faith."13 Even Friedan's feminist critique reflected and contributed to a 
decidedly anti-collectivist cultural climate, and thus complemented the state's 
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"narrative repetition of the Cold War message" of individual freedom.14 
Moreover, both implicitly and explicitly, the pejorative assessments of American 
life levied by Cold Warriors and cultural critics alike were suffused with gendered 
tropes of softness, frivolity, and vulnerability. The resuscitation of the autonomous 
self, to which so many mid-century social critics directed their energies, seemed 
inseparable from a reaffirmation of masculinity; what Guy Oakes has called 
"the creation of a new civic ethic tailored to the requirements of the Cold War" 
was tantamount to encouraging traits diametrically opposed to the feminine.15 
Revitalizing (and re-masculinizing) the American character involved 
reasserting the "first principles" of American life.16 "The Soviet Union," one 
Foreign Affairs writer declared in 1950, "is challenging the United States to 
renew and develop for our time the magnificent inheritance of western 
individualism."17 That same year, the National Security Council asserted that, 
despite the immensity of the collectivist threat, "the system of values which 
animates our society—the principles of freedom, tolerance, the importance of 
the individual, and the supremacy of reason over will—are valid and more vital 
than the ideology which is the fuel of Soviet dynamism." Crucial to the successful 
prosecution of the Cold War, the Council argued, was the "practical affirmation, 
abroad as well as at home, of our essential values, that we can preserve our own 
integrity, in which lies the real frustration of the Kremlin design."18 Hence U.S. 
propaganda showed that the nation was "fighting enemy tyranny through the 
power of the individual."19 
American propagandists, however, found their difficult task of formulating 
"an equivalent dogma" for the Cold War further compounded by the vagueness 
of the term "freedom" (formally defined as "the absence of restraint") and the 
fact that both of the belligerents claimed to embrace it.20 Most Western political 
philosophers characterized freedom as "the protection of the individual against 
tyranny," whereas their Soviet and Chinese counterparts asserted the historical-
materialist doctrine of freedom as "an actor's conscious control over the necessity 
which dictates one's actions."21 A prodigiously oversignifying signifier, 
"freedom" has always required clarification through material expression, "a 
fence," cultural anthropologist Dorothy Lee wrote, "around [its] formless idea."22 
Clearly, a merely rhetorical affirmation of individual freedom, even one forcefully 
and consistently reiterated in official pronouncements, the scholarship of the 
intelligentsia, and the middlebrow media, would not suffice to mobilize the 
necessary martial energies. Addressing the crucial question at the center of Cold-
War America, "what are we for?," Eisenhower aide Arthur Larson asserted that 
"It is less important to stress that we are for freedom (since most uncommitted 
peoples accept freedom as an ideal) than to stress that we are for the institutions 
that in fact create and advance freedom"13 
Which institutions performed this work? Red Nightmare, a 1962 propaganda 
film produced by Warner Brothers for the Department of Defense, concludes its 
dystopian tale of small-town American life under Soviet domination by 
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cataloguing the social and political freedoms Americans enjoy. Over a series of 
wholesomely typical images of American life, the narrator, Dragnefs Jack Webb, 
gravely voices the film's moral: 
Freedom: no single word in all the languages of mankind has 
come to mean so much. Freedom to enjoy the simple things in 
life, in the circle of family and friends. Freedom to work in a 
vocation of our choosing. To vote, in open elections, for the 
candidate we believe best qualified. To come, to go, as we 
please. 
Red Nightmare conveyed perhaps more than the filmmakers intended in its final 
appraisal of freedom: "no single word . . . has come to mean so much." Given 
the context of the film's bleak narrative, one assumes that the filmmakers were 
emphasizing freedom's preciousness to Americans; but parse the sentence 
differently, and it reveals the exhaustion "freedom" suffered from 
oversignification. Yet as Webb intones Red Nightmare's last line, aerial footage 
of an urban highway, cars streaming in both directions, comes onscreen.24 
I contend that mobility—more specifically, automobility, a term James Flink 
has used to encapsulate "the combined import of the motor vehicle, the 
automobile industry and the highway, plus the emotional connotations of this 
import for Americans"—took on crucial symbolic value during the 1950s.25 I 
am particularly interested in the ways in which the state, industry, and the 
middlebrow media worked in concert to confer "an aura of naturalness and 
necessity"26 upon the practice of automobility, and thereby upon the National 
System of Interstate and Defense Highways (authorized in 1956). Whatever 
their commercial and military benefits, the Interstates were also a massive 
propaganda event dramatizing to foreign and domestic audiences the freedom 
for which, The New Republic wrote, "in these uncertain times Americans hunger 
for tangible evidence."27 In assuring "the right and even the ability to move 
from place to place,"28 through this monumental project, the state provided a 
space in which those modes of acting and being that fostered a Cold-War species 
of individualism prevailed; the state made (forgive the pun) a concrete 
commitment to a particular type of "American." 
Automobility, then, provided a set of practical parameters for an American 
subjectivity suited to the ideological demands of the Cold War. My use here of 
subjectivity is informed by the poststructuralist project of reinterpreting selfhood 
and identity as historical, social, and always in process. Nan Enstad defines 
subjectivity as "the particular way that an individual becomes a social being, 
part and product of the corner of the world she or he inhabits. Subjectivity is 
thus related to the concepts self and identity, with a crucial distinction: subjectivity 
emphasizes a process of becoming that is never completed. It is based on the 
premise that who one is is neither essential nor fixed, but is continually shaped 
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and reshaped in human social exchange."29 The idealized American subject of 
the Cold War was an analogue, ironically, of what Soviet psychologists heralded 
as the "New Man." 
While it is not my purpose to explore the evolution of Soviet social science, 
it is important to note that by the 1930s Soviet theorists had largely abandoned 
the extreme environmentalism of "vulgar" Marxist conceptions of the individual, 
and reevaluated the degree to which individuals could be "conscious, purposeful 
actors" in society. The revised model of subjectivity, known as the "New Man," 
informed Party-sanctioned literature, history, and economic policy under Stalin. 
Whatever the American image of Soviet citizen as degraded "mass man" and 
automaton, the "New Man" model ascribed greater agency to the individual; 
one Soviet psychologist lauded the state's attempt to produce "a socially 'open' 
man who is easily collectivized and quickly and profoundly transformed in 
behaviour—a man capable of being a steady, conscious and independent person, 
politically and ideologically well trained."30 However, as the American social 
psychologist Raymond A. Bauer insisted, the independence of the "New Man" 
was dependent upon his total internalization of Party doctrine; the individual 
was thus "free to act only within the limits circumscribed by the regime, free to 
act only in the pursuit of socially-accepted goals."31 
Soviet psychology held only passing interest to American political elites, 
except as an egregious example of the way in which social science played 
handmaiden to the Soviet state. More crucial to their critique of the Soviet system 
was the underlying assumption that the state could, through structured 
environments, education, propaganda, coercion, or reward, manufacture the types 
of citizens it desired.32 For American Cold Warriors, the idea that individuals 
were shaped by the state, and existed only by its imprimatur, exposed the 
monstrous nature of the Soviet system. Yet as the Soviet Union engineered its 
"New Man"—"politically and ideologically well-trained"—so did the United 
States require a representative countersubject, the salient quality of which was 
individual autonomy. As a Foreign Affairs commentator asserted in 1949, "the 
end and aim of society and the state ought to be the nurture and propagation of 
a certain kind of man—the independent and self-directing individual."33 Of 
course, this aim, articulated in this manner, acknowledged the role of collectivities 
such as the state in crafting subjectivity. The American Cold-War state would 
have to use, as I argue below, "statist means to individualist ends;" that is, it 
would have to craft policy and institutions conducive to the creation of a subject 
whose dispositions and practices harkened back to the idealized American 
character of old. Like the Soviet "New Man," the American subject was free to 
act and to choose, but only "within the limits circumscribed by the regime." 
Automobility—in particular that of the elevated, limited-access highway of the 
postwar era—metaphorically invoked that freedom and those limits, and thus 
served as an effective symbolic practice of an American subjectivity particularly 
suited to the ideological exigencies of the Cold War. 
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(Auto)mobility and the American Character 
A free American in pursuit of happiness . . . is mobile, is, has 
been, will be, in motion . . . 
James Oliver Robertson34 
Conceptions of individual freedom in the United States have been nurtured 
by spatial and social mobility; or, rather, mobility and individualism have been 
parallel and mutually dependent myths. Leslie Dale Feldman has recently 
identified a strain of liberal individualism, derived from the political theory of 
Thomas Hobbes, that conceives of the freedom to move as primary and essential 
to a range of other freedoms.35 "The intrinsic relationship between movement 
and personal freedom," Gerald R. Houseman has similarly observed, "is verified 
by historical experience which ranges from feudalism to the contrasting 
conditions of black and white settlement in America, from Horatio Alger dreams 
of maximum mobility, social as well as physical, to the hopeless finality of 
Dachau."36 The geographer Eric Leed has also examined the the persistent trope 
of "travel as a demonstration of freedom and means to autonomy": 
The right to travel had entered into the Western definition of 
the free autonomous individual whose associations to others 
are a result of conscious acts of connection, of allegiance and 
contract. . . . These factors—the voluntariness of departure, 
the freedom implicit in the indeterminacies of mobility, the 
pleasure of travel free from necessity, the notion that travel 
signifies autonomy and is a means for demonstrating what 
one "really" is independent of one context or set of defining 
associations—remain the characteristics of the modern 
conception of travel.37 
Mobility has thus been idealized as freedom's inaugural moment and its 
affirming performance. Of course, self-determined mobility—as opposed to that 
of the refugee—has generally been a perquisite of social, political, and economic 
power. The traveler, James Clifford has observed, "is someone who has the 
security and privilege to move about in relatively unconstrained ways."38 Hence 
the free traveler as a cultural and political symbol reinforces and is reinforced 
by specific discourses that distribute power along lines of race, gender, ethnicity, 
class, nationality, and other visible markers of identity. Mobility, ostensibly a 
universal right, has remained a condition of status insofar as its true goal is "not 
movement as such; it is access to people and facilities."39 Hence the mobility of 
the traveler has symbolized proprietorship and mastery over both space and 
self.40 
In 1893, Frederick Jackson Turner enshrined mobility as the formative and 
sustaining practice of American life, one that remained crucial even as white 
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migration to the west subsided over the latter half of the nineteenth century. "He 
would be a rash prophet indeed," Turner wrote, "who should assert that the 
expansive character of American life has now entirely ceased. Movement has 
been its dominant fact, and, unless this training has no effect upon a people, the 
American energy will continually demand a wider field for its exercise."41 Many 
postwar voices echoed Turner. The historian George W. Pierson, for example, 
isolated the American genius in what he called the "M-Factor"—movement, 
migration, and mobility. Affirming that "[m]ovement has always been a major 
ligament in our culture, knit into the bone and sinew of that body of experience 
which we call our history. . . . [and] in the forging of an 'American' character," 
Pierson noted that American archetypes—pioneers, cowboys, rags-to-riches 
industrialists—had been shaped by experiences of migration.42 Pierson argued 
that Americans were in the process of "reconstructing the entire gamut of relations 
for western (or mobile) man." Such a reconstruction, he suggested, could bring 
"new institutions patterned in part on free movement... new relations with the 
physical environment based on a view of nature different from the European . . . a 
new conception of human fellowship . . . and . . . even possibly a new attitude 
toward the self."43 Pierson made grand claims for mobility, but he was not alone. 
Oscar Handlin credited the formation of a specifically American personality to 
the often-traumatic practice of "uprooting."44 Even Lewis Mumford, no great 
proponent of the mobility-oriented built environment of the United States, 
affirmed that movement had been the historical process by which "the social 
man could become an individual."45 
During the Cold War, Suzanne Clark observes, mobility invoked "a brand 
new configuration of cultural history," one that "called upon the old discourses 
of the West. . . to claim that there was and always had been one real American 
identity."46 That identity was the frontier-ranging male individualist, whose heroic 
qualities derived from his constant movement, and who was now all but 
extinguished by the closing of the frontier, the crush of expanding population 
density, and the stagnating comfort of abundance. Could he be resuscitated? Or 
could his twentieth-century analogue arise from current conditions? 
To postwar social scientists like David Riesman, who diagnosed anomie 
and conformity among the white professional-managerial class, "the 
overwhelming experience of American mobility" held promise as a therapeutic-
regenerative practice for the diminished selves of American modernity.47 The 
mobile individual was removed, if only temporarily, from a constricting social 
context, and thrown into situations both disorienting and liberating—what Pierson 
called "experiments in displacement." A good deal of postwar American 
scholarship and literature reaffirmed the journey as a salutary trial by which the 
individual might locate the core of the authentic self.48 Jack Kerouac, one of the 
foremost celebrants of mobility, imagined the road as a maternal space (yet one 
free of women) that revivified those white men who took flight from the vitiating 
mediocrity of square society; On the Road's Sal Paradise sought to leave 
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"confusion and nonsense behind and [perform] our one and only noble function 
of the time, move."49 
If the American road had traditionally been imagined as a sort of spartan 
retreat for the cultivation of the true self, that image complemented another, 
also implicit in Kerouac and other postwar writers: the road as an emporium, 
stocked with an array of lifeways from which the individual could select. "Only 
in America," Riesman wrote in Faces in the Crowd (1952), 
with all class and customary conventions nearly gone, does 
each geographical move imply a set of new and chancy human 
encounters—encounters with people who.. . compel and invite 
us to treat them to some degree as individuals. As tennis and 
golf players keep looking for those whose game is just a little 
better than theirs—but a game to which they can lift themselves 
by effort—so this mobility allows us to look for those whose 
life is in significant respects just a little better but whose 
"lifemanship" is still within our potential grasp.50 
Faces in the Crowd and its predecessor, the popular The Lonely Crowd, 
rehearsed for the era of social psychology what had become a standard agon in 
American social criticism, namely, reconciling the individualistic tenets of the 
culture's value system and the increasingly corporate nature of everyday life. 
Riesman and his collaborators asserted that "Americans"—implicitly defined 
as white, middle-class American men, and perhaps a few women—no longer 
possessed an individualistic orientation. However hoary its thesis, The Lonely 
Crowd refrained from the polemic and moralizing that usually attended claims, 
scholarly and otherwise, of Americans' growing conformity. Instead, Riesman 
and his coauthors developed an ostensibly less normative terminology of 
American social character, redescribing the much-lamented "conformity" as a 
shift in social character resulting from the experience of political and economic 
consolidation. In recent decades,"inner direction," the stuff of the rugged 
individualist, had given way to "other-direction," the code of the abject 
organization man: The Lonely Crowd's prescriptive was "autonomy," which 
merged the best traits of both character types. Riesman envisioned "an organic 
development of autonomy out of other-direction," as the latter enabled "a 
sensitivity and rapidity of movement which under prevailing American 
institutions provide a large opportunity to explore the resources of character."51 
Other social scientists shared a view of the resourcefulness and mutability 
of the "mobile self as indicative of nascent associational forms. Some argued 
that other-direction had always been the most prevalent and appropriate social 
character for a democratic society.52 Daniel Lerner affirmed the idea that mobility 
offered a wealth of resources for the construction of an authentic self; mobility 
had been both the cause of the shift in social character and the font of the best 
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elements of other-direction—toleration, egalitarianism, facility for adaptation, 
and empathy. "The crucial word in the transformation of American lifeways," 
Lerner wrote, "is 'mobility.'" 
This nation was founded upon the mobility of the 
individual. . . . Mobile society required a mobile personality, 
a self-system so adaptive to change that rearrangement is its 
permanent mode The mobile person shows a high capacity 
for identifying himself with new and strange aspects of the 
environment. He is capable of handling unfamiliar demands 
upon himself outside his habitual experience.... Empathy is 
the psychic instrument which enables newly mobile persons 
to act effectively in the world. This is why the mobile 
personality is not to be regarded as mere psychic aberration 
or moral degeneration, but as a social phenomenon with a 
history.... [T]he style of modern society is distinctive for its 
capacity to rearrange the "self-system" on short notice.53 
Even among those social scientists sympathetic to other-direction, however, there 
remained suspicions that these best traits of the mobile personality ossified when 
the individual became ensconced in the "organization." Whatever their 
evaluations of other-direction, the proponents of therapeutic mobility had to 
acknowledge that the conditions of displacement and flux that had hewn the 
American character no longer governed the increasingly suburban, corporate 
present. Yet the new world of the postwar white middle class remained one of 
movement; and its instrument was the automobile. 
Automobility as Regenerative Practice 
As early as 1907, when the automobile remained largely a toy of the wealthy, 
Harper s Weekly predicted that it would become "the ready, tireless and faithful 
servant of man throughout the world where civilization has a home or freedom 
a banner."54 As Leslie Dale Feldman notes, "Any technological invention which 
facilitated freedom of movement was certain to be prized in America, where 
Hobbesian atomism and the conception of liberty in terms of freedom from 
impediment were two basic tenets of society."55 By providing the "means for an 
individual to detach herself from an environment of givens and move out to an 
environment of choice, a world of possibilities and unknowns," the automobile 
held promise as an agent of democratization, individuation, and regeneration.56 
Early twentieth-century writings on the automobile emphasized its ability to 
reanimate "the values of the frontier by making movement a permanent state of 
mind."57 The first generation of motor touring narratives, authored mostly by 
white elites, viewed movement across the continent as a direct way of tapping 
into and being refreshed by a pure and authentic America; indeed, as George 
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Pierson quipped, the archetypal pioneer in westward motion had been "the first 
auto-mobile."58 
Of course, there was a different valence to the mobility practiced in the 
expansionist past and the automobility of contemporary motorists. The historical 
experiences of American mobility had generally been those of immigration or 
migration across great distances (though what constituted a great distance had 
changed); automobility related more to circulation, shorter-distance movement 
for the purposes of commuting, consumption, and tourism.59 The controlled 
environments of modern roads, sumptuous car interiors, and plentiful roadside 
amenities differed dramatically from the hardship of earlier movement; rather 
than occasions for the testing of inner mettle, the environment and experiences 
of contemporary driving increasingly became objects of consumption.60 
The postwar celebration of mobility as a revitalizing force was predictably 
gender-coded. As mentioned above, many social critics' conceptions of the new 
American character equated the transformation of that character with the 
assumption of traditionally feminine qualities and sensibilities; a number saw 
mobility as a practice capable of counteracting what, in the Cold War context, 
appeared to be a crippling "domestication" of American men. If men were to 
reclaim their manhood, the "open road" stood as one of the sites of that 
reclamation. Male social critics of the era tended, therefore, to emphasize actual 
and metaphorical motion in their prescriptions for the revitalization of American 
society (which was inseparable from a renewal of masculinity). Yet in an age of 
effortless automobility, the vision of journey-as-trial became increasingly difficult 
to sustain. Hence George Pierson lamented the process of travel standardization 
as "the emasculation of the journey," movement in which "much of the excitement 
has been drained off."61 Yet despite the less arduous nature of travel by modern 
automobile, the notion of the journey as recreating the salutary conditions of 
the male pioneer remained powerful and pervasive.62 
Indeed, the genius of the automobile, its supporters maintained, was its 
ability to join the heroic self-determination of a mythologized past to that of a 
limitless future. Well before the Cold War, automobility promised "the dream 
of modernity, of self-actualized individuals unconstrained by their pasts, or by 
place, with their lives shaped only by their choices."63 The rhetoric of early 
motorists, the automobile industry, and advocacy organizations such as the 
American Automobile Association, enthused that "Everything was up to you; 
everything was open, like the road itself."64 Motoring through Indiana in 1916, 
Theodore Dreiser observed that "the prospect of new and varied roads... appears 
to make a man independent and give him a choice in life."65 The roads that 
stretched out before Dreiser beckoned not only because they were well-
constructed or had historical import as drover trails, rutted prairie schooner 
tracks, or routes of the exiled and the called, but also as opportunities for the 
exercise of his autonomous will, opportunities that the crush of urban life had 
narrowed or precluded. Americans in the postwar era "were constantly reminded 
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in advertising, television shows, and popular songs," that, on the road, "they 
were truly 'free,' modern versions of western pioneers."66 Time, in a 1957 article 
on roadbuilding, asserted that the "panorama of road builders stringing highways 
across the land reflects a peculiarly American genius, one that lies deep in the 
traditional pioneering instincts of the nation."67 
The individuation of movement enabled by the automobile threw into relief 
the constraints imposed by rail travel and other multiuser conveyances, with 
their inflexible schedules and itineraries. Cast "as rail's natural, democratic rival," 
the automobile came to dominate American transportation policy by the mid-
twentieth century.68 The assertion of the automobile as an individualist machine 
grew more vigorous with the tremendous growth in sales between 1915 and 
1930. During this time ownership and driver licensing began to "trickle down" 
to working-class whites, people of color and recent immigrants, and women, as 
Fordist production brought prices down and the state pursued increasingly 
aggressive roadbuilding policies and expanded the bureaucracy servicing 
automobility. Indeed, the rise of the automobile as both the foundation of a 
juggernaut industry and as a cultural symbol was predicated on the extension of 
its promise to these more marginalized communities. No longer the prohibitively 
expensive contraption of the wealthy, the mass-produced automobile came to 
represent "the kind of individualist equality particularly well suited to American 
values."69 Its ascendancy, moreover, was and continues to be characterized not 
as a mandate of the state or of industry, but as the consequence of individual 
Americans overwhelmingly "voting" in favor of automobility.70 
Of course, automobile and related industries had, from the very first, spent 
liberally "on advertising to define freedom as equivalent to individual mobility," 
and had promoted the automobile's "application as a status object and symbol 
of liberation."71 By the 1930s, those industries had begun to appeal directly to 
the public to press for more roadbuilding initiatives. General Motors, for example, 
sponsored industrial designer Norman Bel Geddes's "Futurama" exhibit at the 
1939 World's Fair in New York. Futurama conveyed fairgoers through a future 
America (the world of 1960) in which automotive traffic flowed effortlessly 
through urban areas, and scenic, landscaped, high-speed highways (based on 
the German autobahnen) traversed the countryside. Futurama and other industrial 
appeals to the public linked highways inextricably withprogress and the material 
abundance and ease of living, freedom, and social harmony that term signified. 
Writing in support of his urban and suburban plan, Bel Geddes explicitly tethered 
his proposed "magic motorways" to a modern vision of the good life: 
Already the automobile has done great things for people. It 
has taken man out beyond the small confines of the world in 
which he used to live. Distant communities have been brought 
closer together. Throughout all recorded history, man has made 
repeated efforts to reach out farther and farther and to 
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communicate with other men more easily and quickly, and 
these efforts have reached the climax of their success in the 
twentieth century. This increasing freedom of movement 
makes possible a magnificently full, rich life for the people of 
our time. A free-flowing movement of people and goods across 
our nation is a requirement of modern living and prosperity.72 
Bel Geddes's 1940 paean to automobility would be echoed over the next 
decade by a growing chorus of industrial interests and representatives of the 
state (who often were one and the same). Auto executive George Romney was 
confident, as Frederick Jackson Turner had been before him, that the American 
tradition of mobility would compel further and grander roadbuilding. "For we 
Americans," he concluded, "are inherently the most restless of peoples; and, as 
long as this trait is dominant in us, our land shall doubtless continue to provide 
the ideal climate for the vehicle's road-creative proclivity."73 "America lives on 
wheels," Eisenhower's Treasury Secretary George Humphrey proclaimed, "and 
we have to provide the highways to keep America living on wheels and keep the 
kind and form of life we want."74 In many cases, the automobile and related 
industries underwrote scholars' "analyses" of automobility: "One comes to 
perceive," wrote the historian Bernard DeVoto in a 1956 Ford highway-advocacy 
pamphlet, "that the American road represents a way of life."75 A participant at 
the 1950 "Highways in Our National Life" symposium at Princeton University 
similarly stated that "the dynamic character of American society owes much to 
the first rude highways over which toiled the pioneers on horseback, on foot, in 
wagons, and in prairie schooners. It owes even more to the hard-surfaced highway 
which today links the country in a huge and mobile network."76 A1956 Collier s 
article promoting the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways 
asserted that "it is the automobile, more than any single phenomenon, that sets 
our way of life apart from the rest of the world."77 Another author observed in 
1952 that, to the car owner 
the family bus means a number of things, but above all it spells 
a freedom of movement undreamed of by his ancestors and 
known to all too few of his neighbors in other lands. Perhaps 
it is an unconscious realization of the deeper meaning of this 
freedom which puts added timbre in his voice as he drives up 
to the gasoline pump and calls out expansively, "Fill 'er up!"78 
To be sure, Red Nightmare was not alone in its deployment of the automobilized 
cityscape as a defining image of American freedom. Automobility, its supporters 
in the 1950s declared, was not merely dominant; it was gloriously regnant.79 Its 
reign continues, as transportation analyst James A. Dunn, Jr. has recently averred: 
"the kind of planning, land-use, and auto-restrictive powers needed to stem the 
tide of automobility are literally, un-American."80 
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Something to Want: The Interstate Highway System 
Automobility's promise in the postwar imagination could be read in a 1955 
highway-promoting advertisement for Republic Steel—a major contractor for 
the Interstates—which asked Saturday Evening Post readers, "Do you ever dream 
of an open road?" The ad depicted a young white man and woman out for a 
leisurely drive on a modern highway, the overpasses in the distance confirming 
that it is one of the limited-access highways newly proposed to Congress. The 
man wears a suit and tie and a pleasantly surprised smile. The woman smiles 
broadly, her face angled toward him. They are likely a young married couple, 
suburban, middle-class, the intended beneficiaries of the postwar economic 
boom. "To whirl along with all the joy your car has to offer," the copy enthused, 
"that's something to want."81 
In the years leading up to its authorization by Congress in 1956, the proposed 
National System of Interstate and Defense Highways was portrayed by 
politicians, bureaucrats, engineers, military officials, business leaders, and the 
popular media as the fulfillment of middle-class Americans' desires for 
automotive safety, national security, economic prosperity, and expanded mobility. 
It was to be the most massive public works project in human history: from 1956 
to 1975, over 42,500 miles of the continental U.S. would be paved; and a federal 
trust fund would raise and distribute over $100 billion in construction costs. 
First approved as a public works priority in 1944, the Interstates had been 
forcefully promoted over the previous three decades by a constellation of interests 
known collectively as the highway lobby or the "Road Gang": the oil, cement, 
rubber, automobile, insurance, trucking, chemical, and construction industries; 
consumer and political groups such as the American Automobile Association, 
the National Highway Users' Conference, and the American Association of State 
Highway Officials; investment bankers, who sought to finance roadbuilding; 
and the military, which, having seen Hitler's autobahnen, envisioned a network 
of efficient and durable highways for the rapid movement of troops and matériel. 
Historians have noted that President Eisenhower has received perhaps 
inordinate credit for implementing a highway plan that had been formulated by 
previous administrations.82 However, as Richard O. Davies argues, an 
examination of the Eisenhower administration does "provide an understanding 
of the temper of the times and the thinking of the administrative leaders that is 
essential for understanding the political climate that produced the Interstate 
system."83 Eisenhower's political sensibilities reflected the "ideologically rooted, 
interest-driven, and institutionally amplified anti-statist influences [that] acted 
to constrict, constrain, and mold the federal government's efforts at power 
creation" during the Cold War.84 This anti-statism mandated the public perception 
"that the U.S. Government, unlike its evil Soviet counterpart, did not direct 
labor activity or academic research or journalistic endeavors; it was all the product 
of individuals freely making their own decisions and pursuing their own 
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warfare state at odds with itself, as it simultaneously sought to marshal power as 
a collective entity (in its policy acts) and to emphasize the superfluity and 
illegitimacy of collectivities (in its propaganda). 
The dilemma seemed particularly acute for the Eisenhower Administration, 
which was charged by its Republican supporters with the daunting task of 
curtailing and dismantling a popular and, for the most part, successful Democratic 
New Deal. Eisenhower consistently admonished against "regimented statism" 
and dependence upon government to '"bring us happiness, security and 
opportunity,"' and he sought to "[arrest] the momentum of New Deal liberalism 
and [ensure]... that 'our economy... remain, to the greatest possible extent, in 
private hands."'86 The statism Eisenhower feared was not merely the incipient 
socialism he and other Republicans saw reflected in the New Deal, but also the 
transformation of the United States into the garrison society that his predecessor, 
Truman, had indicated might be a Cold-War necessity.87 However, as a career 
military officer, Eisenhower respected the efficacy of bureaucratic entities in 
orchestrating massive projects and in enforcing harmony among a plurality of 
competing interests. His faith in centralized command organizations (of which 
the state and private corporations were both examples), coupled with his distrust 
of popular politics, led him to a political faith that mediated between laissez-
faire economics and state activism on a case-by-case basis. This "middle of the 
road" sensibility, Eisenhower believed, safeguarded the freedom of the individual 
from all threats, whether they came from the operations of the private economy, 
from class conflict fueled by demagoguery, or from the creeping socialism that 
the most interventionist programs of the New Deal represented. 
Whatever its anxieties over state power, then, the Eisenhower Administration 
demonstrated a willingness to channel public resources to reinforce a "system 
that encourages individualism" that the President considered the genius of 
American society.88 Aware that in the middle of the twentieth century "the old 
values of individualism and self-help had been grievously discredited . . . and 
could never be resuscitated in their starkest form," Eisenhower lauded an ethic 
that was not "rugged individualism in the old-fashioned Republican sense of 
the word," but "freedom and independence for the individual with its collateral 
responsibility for cooperation."89 He was not averse to using the power of the 
state to remedy situations in which "the individual"—defined variously as an 
economic agent, as a political and social atom, and as ideological ordnance— 
was imperiled. 
Although the anachronistic ideology of "pure" individualism rejected the 
notion that collectivities such as the state could or should take an active role in 
shaping selfhood, the individualism of mid-twentieth century American culture 
acknowledged the environmental contexts of the self, and even celebrated the 
individual's identity as a member of a "team." The individual, asserted 
Eisenhower aide Gabriel Hauge, "comes into this world a bundle of unrealized 
potentials with a capacity for growth. Our concept of the interaction between 
the individual and his environment is that his capacities must be exercised to 
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attain their full potential and must be developed in order to be effectively 
exercised."90 Taking a similarly optimistic (some might have said suspiciously 
Marxist) view of what could be characterized as a social self'was the historian 
of Russia and the Soviet Union and Rockefeller Foundation consultant Geroid 
Tanquary Robinson, who, in 1949, had pondered the ambit of the state in 
cultivating the individuals required for the "ideological combat" of the Cold 
War: 
Today there is hardly a man in the United States who does not 
believe that within recent decades it has become necessary 
for the Government to do more for the people than it did a 
hundred years ago. Yet there still persists . . . much more 
vigorously here than in any other great country, a vigorous 
individualism and a strong and wholesome fear of all great 
concentrations of power, whether in private or public hands. 
If the fundamental objective were agreed upon, and kept 
steadily in mind—the nurture of a certain kind of man—might 
there not be hope of at least a partial reconciliation of the old 
individualism with the new stateism [sic] of today? Could not 
the beginnings of a reconciliation be made by recognizing as 
fundamental the difference between government action which 
is designed to build up the independence and self-sufficiency 
of the individual citizen, and government action which tends 
to establish permanent discipline and dependence?91 
It is this principle, using—(to borrow, with apologies, from Herbert Croly) statist 
means to achieve individualist ends—that I see behind the Eisenhower 
administration's creation of the Interstate Highway System. 
Eisenhower was careful to differentiate the highway initiative in character 
and in financing scheme from the Democratic public-works projects of the recent 
past. His intention was to make the project appear less statist than it inevitably 
was, and thereby to avoid what critics in his own party would condemn as "another 
ascent into the stratosphere of New Deal jitterbug economics."92 He was generally 
unsympathetic to the Utopian plans of social planners such as Robert Moses and 
Norman Bel Geddes; their conceptions, while sharing Eisenhower's enthusiasm 
for automobility, evinced too much of a "planning" sensibility. Instead of 
proposing the highway system as a form of progressive social engineering, 
Eisenhower emphasized it as a response to a crisis, necessitated by the 
democratically-produced and therefore unplanned triumph of automobility.93 
The modern highway, George Romney asserted, was, "like the vehicles that 
created it . . . the product of the people, a thing made by the people for the 
people."94 
With the end of the Korean War in 1953, the Eisenhower administration 
devoted more attention to highway matters. In a speech to the annual Governor's 
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Conference at Lake George, New York, in July 1954, Vice President Nixon 
(Eisenhower was at his sister-in-law's funeral) stunned an audience expecting 
the administration's usual fiscal conservatism by announcing a $50 billion 
highway plan. This speech provides a sense of the political gymnastics required 
for Eisenhower to undertake such a massive public-works project and still retain 
his credibility as a conservative. More illuminating for this analysis than the 
particulars of the plan itself, however, is the opening apologia with which 
Eisenhower, speaking through his proxy, Vice President Nixon, primed his 
audience for the uncharacteristic proposal. He began by asking the governors, 
"where is the United States going, and by what road?" 
[T]he road we should take is outlined by the American 
philosophy of government... rooted in individual rights and 
obligations—expressed in maximum opportunity for every 
individual to use rights and to discharge obligations— 
maintained by keeping close to the individual his control over 
his government—it is sparked by local initiative, encouraged 
and furthered by the Federal government. Financed 
traditionally by demanding of visible, tangible and profitable 
return on every dollar spent. A tax economy of enterprises, 
directly or indirectly, which are self-liquidating. Now, that 
philosophy, applied to public affairs, is the middle road 
between chaos on the one side, and regimentation on the other. 
It is significant that in the United States we talk of individual 
rights, we talk of States' rights, but not of Federal rights, 
because the Federal Government is normally considered a 
depository of certain well-defined and limited obligations: for 
national security, for foreign affairs, for leadership within the 
community of 48 States. Now, in that light, what are the 
domestic jobs that must be done to further the purposes of 
America? What is the prospect before us?95 
This initial articulation shows the edifice of legitimation Eisenhower and his 
allies in government and industry had constructed underneath their grand plan. 
It was characterized as fundamentally responsive to the existing reality of 
pervasive automobility and not as an inducement to further automobility.96 The 
current highway system, Nixon said, "is obsolete because it just happened." In 
other words, the people had made clear their preference for automobility; now 
it was up to the state and industry to make more extensive and efficient that 
expression of public will. 
The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, the battles over and passage of 
which are well documented by Mark Rose and Tom Lewis, ensured the triumph 
of automobility in the twentieth century.97 Despite its protestations to the contrary, 
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the federal government under Eisenhower did more than "accelerate a shift that 
was already under way" and give "added impetus to the rising dominance of the 
auto;"98 rather, the state adopted an activist role in promoting automobility. The 
economic windfall the Interstate program delivered was only part of the 
administration's justification. At least as important was the so-ubiquitous-as-to-
be-imperceptible affirmation of automobile driving as an eminently worthwhile 
practice, one constitutive of the type of American subjects the Cold-War state 
required for the ideological prosecution of the Cold War. It was highly significant 
that highways, as David Riesman noted, were, "aside from schools, the only 
collective product not to be condemned as creeping socialism."99 
Automobility as Centripetal Force 
Once on a superhighway, you are a kind of captive . . . 
—Good Housekeeping, 1955100 
I ask here that we consider the highway and automobility not in terms of 
their practical utility but in terms of the performances they enable. Automobility, 
as I have argued, was the twentieth-century manifestation of the more ancient 
spectacular gesture of moving to represent oneself as an unfettered and self-
directing agent.101 More specifically, my focus here is how automobility might 
have figured as a palliative to the political and cultural anxieties effected by the 
Cold War. While the Cold War did not "cause" the Interstate Highway System, 
it did create the conditions under which automobility (which had been a powerful 
and transformative force in American culture before the Cold War) took on a 
redoubled significatory power. Viewed in this historical context, the act of driving 
becomes a sort of ideological exercise that was seen to reverse, or at least to 
arrest, the postwar "decline of the individual" and the deterioration of the 
"American character" of a heroic and expansionist past. The figure of the driver, 
moreover, embodied the ideological gulf separating the United States from its 
communist antagonists, and proved—to those antagonists, to allied nations, to 
those cultures the United States sought to sway ideologically, and, most important, 
to Americans themselves—the continuing vitality of the essential individual 
freedom enjoyed under liberalism and capitalism. 
What happens when one drives? Recent inquiries into the significance of 
automobility suggest reasons for its appeal to partisans of a centrifugal 
individualism and to elites stressing the need for commitment to and consensus 
on capitalism and liberalism. For example, the libertarian philosopher Loren E. 
Lomasky has argued that 
automobility complements autonomy: the distinctively human 
capacity to be self-directing. An autonomous being is not 
simply a locus at which forces collide and which then is moved 
by them. Rather, to be autonomous is, minimally, to be a valuer 
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with ends taken to be good as such and to have the capacity to 
direct oneself to the realization or furtherance of these ends 
through actions expressly chosen for that purpose. Motorists 
fit this description. Therefore, insofar as we have reason to 
regard self-directedness as a valuable human trait, we have 
reason to think well of driving automobiles Automobility 
has value because it extends the scope and magnitude of self-
direction.102 
I want to join Lomasky in affirming that an individual's operation of a car does, 
in fact, facilitate autonomy, though I remain more interested in naming exactly 
the species of human agency the term "autonomy" implies. 
Not everyone in the postwar era looked favorably on automobility. George 
F. Kennan, for one, saw in the "motorization" of American life an infantilizing 
process that destroyed the virtues on which citizenship depended. The rambling 
modern motorist was a far cry from the pioneer who had "won the west," and 
would, by extension, win the Cold War. Once the force behind American 
dynamism and strength, mobility had, according to Kennan, degenerated into a 
practice of caprice, evasion and flight rather than mission.103 His dim view of 
automobility was consonant with his and other Cold Warriors' disdain for the 
American hoipolloi more generally. Kennan's imperial remove notwithstanding, 
in his assertion that automobility encouraged an infantile and insubstantial way 
of moving through the world, Kennan presaged more recent critiques of the 
road and and its subjects. 
Jean Baudrillard, driving the colossal and tortuous Los Angeles freeways 
in the 1980s, observed that, despite automobility's much-hailed emancipatory 
sensations, "the freeway is a place of integration," its codes constantly organizing 
"a total collective act." One feels the rush of freedom (the "truly profound 
pleasure . . . of keeping on the move") amid the mandatory protocols and 
procedures of highway driving.104 Joan Didion has noted that the highway offers 
"the only secular communion Los Angeles has," a pleasurable submission to the 
stream of traffic. For the protagonist of Didion's novel Play It As It Lays, driving 
the freeways is both a way to feel a small degree of agency and a singularly 
effective tranquilizer; elsewhere Didion describes the participation in the freeway 
community of motion as requiring "a total surrender, a concentration so intense 
as to seem a kind of narcosis, a rapture-of-the-freeway."105 More recently, 
Margaret Morse has described the "virtual" practice of freeway driving as 
enabling the "derealisation" of the subject: the driver sits "in a realm of passage, 
both over the outside world and from inside an idyllic, intensely private, steel-
enclosed world of relative safety."1061 contend that, like Riesmanian autonomy, 
which struck a balance between a robust inner individualism and outward 
acquiescence to social norms, driving enables an affirmative performance of 
energy, speed, and motion as it diminishes other types of individual agency. 
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Christopher Newfield has recently examined the specific features of the 
American individualism deriving most directly from Emerson. Emersonian 
individualism, Newfield argues, has contributed to and normalized a subjectivity 
of submission, in which the individual, instead of expanding his personal 
autonomy and political agency, abdicates both. According to Newfield, the 
linguistic blandishments of individualism, self-reliance, and independence that 
surround the liberal subject disguise its actual status as a subjectivity of 
accommodation and obedience through which "nondemocratic modes of 
democratic governance continue to actualize themselves." Newfield sees ample 
evidence of this "Emerson effect" in current liberal rhetoric about the global 
market, the federal government, and other seemingly unassailable institutional 
powers, under the thrall of which "[t]he autonomous individual has disappeared, 
but so has democratic sovereignty." Genuine individualism has given way in 
middle-class culture to a make-believe autonomy, "the seeing of freedom as an 
uncontrollable system's flexibility."107 
Newfield's trenchant analysis of the kernel of submission at the center of 
Emersonian individualism echoes the nineteenth-century critique leveled by 
Tocqueville. As Tocqueville envisioned it, individualisme, with its emphasis on 
private gratification and spectacular or performative independence, was 
essentially a practice of withdrawal; it turns political nonparticipation and 
inefficacy into a sort of virtue, and leaves to an abstract "majority" the power to 
govern.108 This withdrawal into privatism therefore had the potential to establish 
the conditions for the rise of an antidemocratic power. Tocqueville had no name 
for the regime he saw looming on the American horizon, though he did, at the 
conclusion of Democracy in America, sketch its features. This "immense and 
tutelary power" would preclude genuine freedom in citizens, instead functioning 
only 
to secure their gratifications and watch over their fate. That 
power is absolute, minute, provident, and mild. . . . [I]t tries 
to keep them in perpetual childhood ...[;] it daily makes the 
exercise of free choice less useful and rarer, restricts the 
activity of free will within a narrower compass, and little by 
little robs each citizen of the proper use of his own faculties. 
. . . I have always thought that this brand of orderly, gentle, 
peaceful slavery which I have just described could be 
combined, more easily than is generally supposed, with some 
of the external forms of freedom.. . ,109 
The irony is striking: the individualist ethos ultimately produces an apathetic 
and infantile citizenry that willingly abdicates its authority to a paternalistic 
power; in return that power maximizes the opportunities for the spectacular 
expression of freedom and autonomy so affirming to the individualist.110 
Tocqueville suggested that as real democratic freedom—participation in and 
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direct influence over the political, social, and economic forces that shape one's 
life—erodes, the range of opportunities for the performance of freedom may 
increase.111 The individualist thus withdraws further from the political sphere, 
consoling himself with a life increasingly oriented toward "a display of energy"— 
circulation and consumption in lieu of democratic engagement.112 
Tocqueville found no appropriate name for the type of regime he saw 
approaching on the American horizon (perhaps he had only one good neologism, 
individualisme, in him). "Our contemporaries," he wrote, "will find no prototype 
of it in their memories The thing is new."113 Neither "tyranny" nor "despotism" 
represented accurately its form of control, which would masquerade as the 
proliferation of freedoms and choices. Tocqueville's "soft totalitarian" scenario 
finds affinity with the later analyses of modern power and consumer society 
advanced in the critical theory of the Frankfurt School and in poststructuralist 
theories of subjectivity. It echoes in the descriptions of "totalitarian democracy" 
and "repressive tolerance" in the work of Herbert Marcuse; in Theodor Adorno 
and Max Horkheimer's condemnation of the deception at the heart of mass-
culture escapism and market choice; and in Michel Foucault's theory of the 
"productive" rather than repressive orientation of power in modernity.114 
Tocqueville presciently glimpsed the signal element of modern power—its 
deployment of seduction and consent rather than coercion as the central means 
of social control. Under this type of regime, power is understood less as the 
capacity to control subjects than as the ability to create them through discursive 
practice and ideological interpellation. 
Newfield's thesis in The Emerson Effect descends more directly from the 
assertion of the docility of the liberal subject made by Foucault, who historicized 
the abstraction of the individual as a product of power. For Foucault, the 
individual is never primal or natural, but rather a product of various discourses— 
economic, theological, political, juridical, and medical—that affirm and 
perpetuate the very idea of the individualized "self." As George Kateb has written, 
Foucault alleges that modern individualism is, appearances 
notwithstanding, the result of techniques of discipline. The 
more each person regards himself or herself as distinct from 
others, as special, as acting spontaneously, as living in response 
to the deep promptings of one's unique inner life, the more 
one is being victimized by the disciplinary and docility-
inducing techniques of modern power [Their result] is the 
creation or "fabrication" of an individual identity, an identity 
acquired by docile absorption of the habits and, above all, of 
the words and meanings implanted by technicians.115 
Emerson's formulation of the individualist ethos provides a conceptual 
framework for imagining oneself an abstract and free individual. 
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Consider the structured freedom of highway driving through Foucault's 
understanding of subject-formation and reinforcement through practice and 
language and Tocqueville's related conception of "tutelary power."116 Like 
Newfield, novelist John Updike has characterized Emerson's exhortations to 
individualism as "a curious counsel of fatalism couched in the accents of 
activism." The impress of Emerson's thought, Updike writes, is not only 
discernible in the inner lives of Americans and in the institutions of liberalism, 
but in the built environment as well: 
His encouragements have their trace elements in the 
magnificent sprawl we see on all sides—the parking lots and 
skyscrapers, the voracious tracts of single-family homes, the 
heaped supermarket aisles and crowded ribbons of highway: 
the architectural manifestations of a nation of individuals, of 
wagons each hitched, in his famous phrase, to its own star.117 
Those wagons, however, move in determined ways. Roadbuilders have 
continually sought to contain the potentially dissenting/destructive agency of 
the driver. One analyst commented that "The man at the wheel is in many ways 
the most complex and baffling element in the trafficway-driver-vehicle system."118 
Norman Bel Geddes noted in 1940 that the contemporary driver's car "has been 
entirely remodeled" and that "his highway is being remodeled." Looking ahead 
to the "magic motorways" of 1960, Bel Geddes mused, "How can the driver be 
remodeled?" Like 1950s Federal Highway Administration chief Bertram Tallamy, 
Bel Geddes proposed that this remodeling entail a structural diminution of human 
agency on the road, effected through automotive and highway design. While 
Bel Geddes's prescription predates the Cold War and the conception of freedom 
that prevailed during its early years, it speaks to the ever-present themes of 
discipline and regulation at the heart of automobility: 
. . . these cars of 1960 and the highways on which they drive 
will have in them devices which will correct the faults of human 
beings as drivers. They will prevent the driver from committing 
errors. They will prevent him from turning out into traffic 
except when he should. They will aid him in passing through 
intersections without slowing down or causing anyone else to 
do so and without endangering himself or others. Many present 
beginnings give hints of the kind of over-all planning on which 
the near future could realize. Everything will be designed by 
engineering, not by legislation, not in piecemeal fashion, but 
as a complete job. The two, the car and the road, are both 
essential to the realization of automatic safety. . . . [I]n 1960 
[all drivers] stay out of the ditch. It is not done by law, but 
through the very nature of the car and the highway.119 
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While Bel Geddes's dreams have not yet come to pass, there can be little doubt 
that the limited-access highways of the 1950s augmented the disciplinary effect 
on the driver—increasing the speeds at which and the distances over which one 
could travel, but also regulating access and egress, and standardizing the 
experience of travel. 
While the expanded automobility of the postwar era increased white middle-
class consumer and residential choice and provided the sensory experience of 
freedom, it simultaneously limited the possibilities for alternative spatial, 
economic, social and political configurations.120 As a quotidian performance of 
both self-direction and acquiescence to systemic parameters, driving served as 
a metaphor for American citizenship during the early Cold War, a time in which 
certain beliefs, utterances, and practices would quickly, so to speak, wreck one 
in the ditch. The narrative of the automobile as a centrifugal entity, a bringer of 
wild and outlaw freedom, was precisely what enabled it to function as such an 
effective tool for the centripetal regulation of the subject. To drive was to live 
motion without change. 
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